Abstract. We present a development of the theory of default information structures, combining ideas from domain theory with ideas from non-monotonic logic. Conceptually, our treatment is distinguished from standard default logic in that we view default structures as generating models rather than theories. Reiter's default rules are viewed as non-deterministic algorithms for generating preferred partial models. Using domain-theoretical notions, we improve the standard de nition of extensions in default logic, by introducing the notion of dilation. We prove the existence of such dilations for a new, natural class of default information structures, properly including the so-called semi-normal ones. This class, called the class of rational structures, is a robust generalization of the usual kind of default rule system.
Introduction

Background and related work
Default logics are a class of non-monotonic logics, formal systems for reasoning about common sense and beliefs. An important characteristic of such logics is that conclusions made from beliefs may have to be withdrawn when new evidence disproves them.
Default logic is a generalization of rst order logic with proof rules, called default rules, added to the system to model the consequences of hypothetical assumptions. The sets of such consequences are called extensions. When engaged in preliminary work on the paper, we noticed that the notion of extension su ers from certain fragility problems, and we wondered if there were not a more robust alternative. What follows is an outline of our proposal.
Perhaps the most basic observation is there has been too much dependence in the world of non-monotonic logic on the very idea of a logic. We think that the notion of formal proof is probably not the right way to model the kind of non-monotonic reasoning done by humans. Most researchers probably suspect that real reasoning is semantic. We suggest that instead of thinking about formal proofs, one should consider the more general notion of information, a move suggested by the theory of denotational semantics of programming languages, and also by situation theory 3] .
Toward this end, we introduce the concept of default information structures. These extend the notion of Scott's information systems 18], a general framework accounting for semantic information in the monotonic world. Information systems give an exact characterization of Scott domains, which are certain kinds of complete algebraic partial orders. We extend the idea to the non-monotonic world, combining ideas from default logic and ideas from domain theory. We think that the generalization opens up a host of new possibilities for investigation. Among other things, we nd that default information structures determine partial orders which are not Scott domains, and not even cpo's.
The primary notions in default logic are those of a default theory and its extensions. A default theory consists of a pair (T; ), where T is a set of rst order formulae, is a collection of default rules of the form 1 ; 2 ; m : 1 ; 2 ; ; n :
The intuitive meaning is that if the i 's are part of our current beliefs, and none of the : j 's are current, then it is allowable to believe . Informally, an extension of such a theory is a minimal collection of formulae that can be derived from T by using default rules in but invariant under applications of such rules.
There are certain di culties with the notion of extension { primarily, that they do not exist when they seemingly should. We therefore replace extensions with a new notion, called dilations. Dilations are a weakening of the idea of extension. We give the formal de nition in Section 3, but some discussion is in order now. We quote Reiter 15 , sec. 1.3] on the subject of extensions:
The role of a default is to ll in some of the gaps in the knowledge base : : : so as to permit the inferences necessary to act. Defaults therefore function somwewhat like meta-rules; they are instructions about how to complete an extension of this incomplete theory : : : Now in general there may be many ways of extending an incomplete theory, which suggests that the default rules may be nondeterministic. Di erent applications of the defaults yield di erent extensions and therefore di erent sets of beliefs about the world. The concept of dilation is in the exact spirit of Reiter's discussion. (It is clear that by \extension" Reiter means \an extended set of beliefs" and not the logician's notion of extension as distinct from intension.) As Reiter does, we make a distinction between established facts, and things we believe, including those derived from default rules. We express this using a dilation pair x y , where x represents established information, and y represents plausible information. x and y are just sets of pieces of information, and of course if x y (read y is a dilation of x) then x y. The di erence between the dilation relation and the extension relation is in the way defaults are employed to build the larger world y.
Here Reiter's intuitive view of default rules as instructions is very important. In building a dilation, we try not to think of default rules as proof rules. Our world-building algorithms for dilations are quite removed from the notion of proof.
World building is modeled in two ways in our structures. We have a relation between pieces of information (usually notated`) which models monotonic (strict) forcing of pieces of information, and we have a consistency (better: coherence) predicate on worlds (in fact, this can be derived from the proper notion of entailment). Then, we use defaults, of just the same form as above, to mean that if i 's are currently plausible, and all the j 's are consistent with everything currently plausible, then is also plausible.
One di erence between our systems and default theories is that we separate strict from default inference. Another, more fundamental, di erence is that we do not specify beforehand what pieces of information are. These pieces are just tokens; the only constraint on them is given by meta-axioms on the relation`, and also on the default relations. It is this fundamental di erence which gives our approach its robustness. Of course, the tool has already proved its worth in the standard theory of domains.
Among the papers on default systems in the current literature, one which seems to use methods most closely allied to ours is a paper of Marek, Nerode, and Remmel (MNR) 12]. Inspired by Reiter's original work 15], and by that of Apt 2], MNR generalize default systems using \tokens" in the way we have outlined. They do not assume that a logical language is pre-speci ed. Instead, they work with structures of the form hU; Ni where U is an unstructured set of \objects", and N is a set of default rules somewhat like those we have shown above. They show that their systems include many of the systems in the literature. Interesting algebraic and combinatorial problems can be analyzed in terms of extensions, where the objects represent things like pairings of boys and girls, and extensions represent solutions to the stable marriage problem. Finally, they present a comparison of some of their work to constructions in logic programming, and analyze the recursion-theoretic character of extensions.
Our paper is in the same spirit as that of MNR, but we suggest some new considerations.
Instead of working with an unstructured set U of tokens, we use Scott's fundamental insight that a consistency predicate be assumed to exist on ( nite subsets of) U, and that a natural notion of entailment be de ned as a relation between nite subsets of U as well. This allows us to divorce strict (monotonic) entailment from default entailment, and it gives us a natural setting to treat states of information, extensions, and dilations as xed points. It also allows us to use compactness considerations in our results, as the notion of ideal element in domain theory presumes a compactness property. As a short example of the advantages of assuming a consistency predicate, consider the basic type of default rule used in the Theorist system 13]:
: a a :
The meaning is very clear: if the fact a is consistent, then believe it. The stable marriage problem is easily phrased this way, for example: we can use rules of the above form, where a is the fact that a boy is married to a girl he knows. On the side, using strict entailment, we can specify the inconsistency of a boy's being married to more than one girl at a time. Perhaps a more telling point is that in the framework of MNR, the meaning of the above rule is di cult to express.
Finally, we have found an application for our notion of default models. This involves a family of modal logics which use default information systems as their semantics. This work will appear shortly 17] .
We proceed with a review of some problems with default logic.
Faults of Default Logic
The default logic notion of extension is intended to represent the full consequences of our beliefs. However, in conventional default logic the existence of extensions is not guaranteed, even in reasonable situations where they should exist. There are other limitations of the conventional theory of default logic, which we discuss now. 1. Default logic is not general enough. Because the conventional theory of default logic is strongly based on the syntax of rst order logic, it is not adequate to deal with beliefs in general, not to mention information, where negation may not make good sense. Consider the following beliefs, for an example:
( ) The chicken comes rst.
( ) The egg comes rst. Represented as default rules, we have : ; : :
Here, and are not the negation of one another; they are merely inconsistent with each other. Introducing negation here seems to be super cial. See the example following the de nition of information systems in Section 2 for more evidence.
2. Extensions do not exist in many reasonable cases. Note that default logic has its excuse for this. It o ers one of the possible ways to understand defaults and beliefs. It views conclusions derived from beliefs as evidence which may block the application of other default rules. However, we think that \extensions" should exist more often.
3. Default logic o ers a static, rather than a dynamic account for information. The conventional theory of default logic deals with one theory at a time, and hence does not provide an account of the evolution of information. (We recognize that researchers in the semantics of beliefs have considered the dynamics of epistemic states, in the form of theories of belief revision and theory change (e.g. 11]). Default logic work, though, has not had a similar emphasis.)
4. Default logic is proof-oriented. It is this obstacle which is most di cult to remove. We want to espouse the view of default rules as algorithms for building belief spaces. The conclusion of a default rule should not be thought of as a formula, but as a piece of information. A belief space (of which dilations are one type) will consist of a coherent collection of such pieces of information. As an example, think of a belief space as a hypothetical spread sheet, which lls in incomplete spaces in a real one. (Speci cally, a tax form in which wages have been estimated.) Coherence, or consistency, means that the spread sheet obeys relationships such as \tax is a certain function of adjusted gross income." The pieces of information involved here are just the cells of the spread sheet. Now, we think of strict information { the rst component of a dilation pair { as the incomplete spread sheet without the wages. The second component { the dilation { is the spread sheet with the wages lled in. Obviously, there is no reason to suppose that this piece of information is lled in as the result of a proof. It might be lled in by a rule of thumb { take the state income taxes withheld and divide by the state tax rate.
Our framework helps us to overcome the above problems, especially (2) and (4). Information systems are the way to get at (4), and dilations help us with (2) because they allow us to have more consequences of our beliefs than before. This is because, in our framework, anything derived rationally from a consistent state of belief cannot serve as evidence based on which we withdraw conclusions already made, as long as our new set of beliefs is consistent.
Here is an example to clarify this point (for another more detailed example, see Section 5). In this case we work with standard default logic. Consider the default theory (;; f : a :a g):
According to conventional default logic, this theory has no extension. In our framework, it will turn out that (;; Th(f:ag) ) is a dilation pair (that is, an ordered pair in the dilation relation), where Th stands for standard consequences of'. (See the discussion on the rst page for informal review of dilations, Section 3 for the formal de nition, and section 5 for another example.) The intuitive reason that Th(f:ag) is not an extension is because :a \essentially blocks" the application of the default rule. The same theory is a dilation of ;, because the fact that :a is a plausible consequence of ; allows us to show that Th(f:ag) is merely closed under the usual entailment rules and under the default rule.
Organization and content of this paper
Section 2 contains background material on information systems and sequent structures. These latter systems, fully explicated in Zhang 19] , are a generalization of information systems to account for nondeterministic information, but still monotonic. Using the notations of sequent structures, we de ne default information structures in Section 3.
Section 4 recasts the de nition of extension in rst-order default logic in terms of information; this is in preparation for the more robust notion of dilation to follow. Two de nitions of extensions as xed points of certain operators are given. These lead us to generalize a characterization of Reiter 15] , who shows that these two operators, in the setting of default logic, have the same xed points. We show a much stronger result { in the setting of information systems, these operators are identical.
Section 5 is devoted to a study of our generalization of the notion of extension { the concept of dilation. As indicated above, the dilation relation is a set of pairs (x; y), where x is a set of \known" items of information, and y is a consistent set of \plausible consequences" of x. We show that for a large class of default information structures, properly including the so-called semi-normal ones, that for any consistent set x of known pieces of information, there is a dilation pair (x; y), where x y. This class is the class of rational default structures, which we suggest as a model-theoretic basis for default reasoning. We show that for every rational default structure, there is a semi-normal one with the same dilation pairs. (This involves a crucial use of compactness.) Finally, we prove the fundamental result that for semi-normal structures, and thus for rational ones, dilations always exist. Such is not the case for extensions; moreover, the proof shows the existence of maximal dilations, invoking Zorn's lemma in the general case of arbitrary sets of tokens.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider only the class of rational default structures. Section 6 compares the notions of dilations and extensions. We show that for every consistent x, and for every extension y of x, that y is a minimal dilation extending x. But there can be minimal dilations, in nite examples, where there are no extensions. We show that even for normal default structures, extensions and dilations can be di erent. There is, however, one case in which they are the same: the class of precondition-free default structures, where the default relations are of the form : a a :
We also consider the relationship between dilations and the so-called em modi ed extensions of Lukaszewicz 9] . In this case there are no inclusions between dilations and modi ed extensions. Section 7 contains some preliminary results on the class of partial orders determined by rational default information structures. It is shown that every such order is upper-complete { every nonempty upper directed set has a least upper bound. In contrast to most examples from denotational semantics, there can be in nite descending chains with no greatest lower bound. Furthermore, there can be an uncountable number of minimal elements, even for a countable and very recursively presented information structure. Even in the nite case, we may not have a Scott domain. Finally, we expect that the recursion-theoretic properties of dilations will be at least as complex as those considered by Marek, Nerode, and Remmel. But we have to leave this for further investigation.
Sequent Structures
In this section we recall the basic de nitions of the theory of information systems and sequent structures.
De nition 2.1 A sequent structure is a tuple
where A is a set of tokens, and`is a relation between nite subsets of A, called the entailment relation, satisfying the following conditions:
In addition, we require that ; 6 ;:
It should be emphasized that the set A of tokens is analogous to a set of well-formed sentences, but need not actually be such a set. Nevertheless, we proceed by analogy to the logical case. Thus, when we write X`Y we are imagining that the conjunction of the elements of X implies the disjunction of the elements of Y . Moreover, by X; X 0`Y ; Y 0 we mean X X 0`Y Y 0 .
It is important to remember that when we write X`Y , X and Y are always nite sets of tokens. Note also that since we do not actually have logical connectives and their related rules, Cut cannot be eliminated. In fact, Cut is necessary for the following theorem. A sequent structure determines a family of sets of tokens called its ideal elements. Occasionally, we omit the word \ideal" and simply speak of the elements of a structure.
De nition 2.2 The ideal elements jAj , of a sequent structure A = ( A;`) are subsets x of A which are closed under entailment:
Now we recall the notion of information system. This is a structure originally used to describe the logical relations among propositions that can be made about computation. It consists of a set of information tokens, an entailment relation like that speci ed in De nition 2.1, and an extra consistency predicate. We use the de nition given in Larsen and Winskel 8], which di ers slightly from the original one given by Scott. De nition 2.3 An information system is a structure A = ( A; Con;`) where A is a set of tokens, Con Fin (A); the consistent sets, ` Con A; the entailment relation, The idea is that a pair of rationals stands for the \proposition" that a yet to be determined real number is in the interval q; r] whose endpoints are given by the pair.
De ne a nite set X of \intervals" to be in in Con if X is empty, or if the intersection of the \intervals" in X is nonempty. Then say that a set X`hq; ri i the intersection of all \intervals" in X is contained in the interval q; r]. Note that there is only atomic structure to these propositions. We cannot negate them or disjoin them. So although tokens can conveniently be exempli ed as logical formulas, they cannot always be assumed to be closed under the usual logical syntax. It is also clear that the`relation in general obeys laws like that of logical consequence, but is very much more general. We will take advantage of the generality in our de nition of dilation, in which we will employ a \plausible entailment" operator which we do not intend to be equivalent to any \preferential consequence" logical operator.
An information system determines a family of ideal elements, in the same way a sequent structure does. In the following, we write X fin y to mean X is a nite subset of y.
De nition 2.4 The elements jAj, of an information system A = ( A; Con;`) consists of subsets x of propositions which are 1: nitely consistent: X fin x =) X 2 Con; 2: closed under entailment: X x & X`a =) a 2 x: Example. The ideal elements in our approximate real system are in 1-1 correspondence with the collection of closed real intervals x; y] with x y. Although the collection of ideal elements is partially ordered by inclusion, the domain being described { intervals of reals { is partially ordered by reverse interval inclusion. The total or maximal elements in the domain correspond to \perfect" reals x; x]. The bottom element is a special interval (?1; 1).
We can show that information systems are a special class of sequent structures.
De nition 2.5 A sequent structure A is called deterministic if it satis es the following:
1 (X`Y &X 6 ;) =) 9b 2 Y : X`b; 2 8a 2 A: a 6 ;:
In other words, a deterministic sequent structure is a sequent structure with a generating relation of the form X`Y with j Y j 1 and, moreover, such that each singleton token is consistent.
Theorem 2.2 For every deterministic sequent structure there is an information system with the same ideal elements.
Proof Let (A;`) be a deterministic sequent structure. We can construct an information system in the following way. The information system has the same token set A. The entailment relation`0 is the generating relation for`. De ne Con to be the set f X j X 6 ;g.
We show that the ve axioms for an information system are derivable from the sequent structure. It is su cient to show that 1: X Y & Y 6 0 ; =) X 6 0 ;; 2: a 6 0 ;; 3: X`0 a & X 6 0 ; =) X; a 6 ;; 4: a 2 X =) X`0 a;
It is easy to see that these follow from Theorem 2.1.
2
The collection of ideal elements of a given information system forms a partial order under set inclusion. Scott's fundamental result is that the class of partial orders determined by information systems coincides with the abstract notion of Scott domains: consistently complete algebraic partial orders.
Default Information Structures
With the notation of information systems and sequent structures xed, we come to the main de nition of the paper.
De nition 3.1 A default information structure is a triple A = (A; ;`) where A is a set of tokens, is a ternary relation nite subsets of A, written X : Y Z ;
and (A;`) is a deterministic sequent structure.
Each element of will be called a default. If X : Y Z is a default, we read that fact as follows: if, according to our current information, the pieces of information (i.e. tokens) in X are plausible, and our current information together with the pieces of information in Y are coherent, then all the tokens in Z are plausible.
A frequently used instance the notion of default is the case when Z is a singleton set fag.
In this case we omit the set brackets.
The rst time that a default rule is applied, the information in X is usually known. However the (uncertain) information Z in the conclusion of a default rule can serve as precondition for further applications of default rules. Therefore, to allow for iterated applications of default rules, the propositions in X are thought of as merely plausible (strict information is always plausible).
Example. We rst show how a standard form of Reiter's default logic is one example of our de nition. Let A consist of the closed sentences of rst-order logic. Let Con be the collection of consistent nite subsets of A in the usual sense, and let`be ordinary logical Following the usual terminology, we call X the precondition, Y the justi cation, and Z the conclusion of the default. It is tempting, and in fact allowable, to think of defaults as rules. However, we are o cially just dealing with the ternary relation , with no conditions on it. Later, we will de ne some \transitive" relations generated by and`. But we want to consider itself to be rule-like in character, because intuitively it represents empirically given ways of constructing a belief space. So we will speak of elements of as rules as well as defaults.
In contrast, the entailment relation`captures common properties of sound informational inferences in the monotonic world. This requirement, though, will not be necessary for any of our results.
When can we \apply" a default rule? Suppose y is a coherent set of tokens. (This means, by convention, that every nite subset of y is in Con.) We think of the set y as being a current \plausible world" for some experimenter. The experimenter can add a piece of information b into the set y if X y, and X : Y b 2 & Y y 2 Con: In general, the new piece of information could make the resulting set y fbg incoherent. This is a possibility which we will rule out later by appropriate restrictions on . But for the purposes of de ning our notions of extension and dilation, the restriction is not necessary.
Our notion of default rule application also di ers from that of standard default logic. In order to apply a rule 1 ; 2 ; ; m : 1 ; 2 ; ; n to y, we require that f 1 ; 2 ; ; n g y be consistent rather than y f i g be consistent for each 1 i n (which is weaker, since whenever f 1 ; : : : ; n g y 2 Con, then for each i, f i g y 2 Con). The following example shows that it is strictly stronger:
Example Consider the default information structure (fa; b; cg; ;`) where = f : a; b c g; and`is generated by (is the smallest entailment relation such that) fa; bg`;: In this case c can be derived from ; by applying the default rule if we only require a and b be consistent separately. However, c cannot be derived if we insist that fa; bg be consistent.
Our feeling is that the joint consistency of the set y f 1 ; : : :; n g is a more reasonable condition than separate consistency for application of the default rule to the set y. Support for this position comes from the paper of Reiter and Criscuolo 14] . This was the original paper introducing semi-normal default theories. Although the de nition of general default rules in that paper refers to separate consistency of each of the justi cations, none of the examples ever use it. All of them require joint consistency: that a conjunction of justi cations be consistent. In particular, the de nition of a semi-normal default rule (Section III) requires joint consistency. We conjecture that one can develop a notion of dilation using separate consistency. However, we have no proof of this, and have not yet investigated this direction. We next de ne successively more limited classes of default information structures. 
Extensions
First we recall the notion of \deductive closure", associated with standard information systems 2 . Let (A;`) be a deterministic sequent structure, and G a consistent subset of A. G, the deductive closure of G, is the set fa j 9X fin G: X`ag: Proposition 4.1 G is an (ideal) element of (A;`).
Proof Recall that when we say that G is consistent, we mean that for every nite subset X of G, X 6 ;. We have to check two things: one is that G remains consistent, and the other is that it is deductively closed, i.e., G = G:
Let X be a nite subset of G. Then for each element c of X, there is a nite subset X c of G such that X c`c (Take X c to be fcg if c 2 G). Let X 0 = S c2X X c . By the weakening law for sequent structures we have 8c 2 X: X 0`c :
The second conclusion of Theorem 2.1 asserts that whenever X`Z, we also have X 0`Z . However, X 0 is a subset of G. Therefore G is both consistent and deductively closed.
2
It is easy to see that the deductive closure operator plays a role analogous to that of the theory operator Th in rst-order logic. But, as we have warned, this is only an analogy.
We can now de ne extensions for a default information structure.
(From now on, we will use default rules with single tokens as conclusions.)
De nition 4.1 Let A = (A; ;`) be a default information structure, and x an element of jAj. De ne, for a set S of consistent propositions of A, ? x (S) to be the smallest set such Call E an extension of x if it is a xed point of the operator ? x , i.e. ? x (E) = E: This de nition makes sense when x is any set, consistent or not, but we do not need to consider inconsistent x's. When we write ? x (S), we will intend that x be consistent. Observe that ? x need not be monotonic in S. Observe also that an extension is not necessarily unique.
Examples. (1) Refer to the eight queens problem in the last section. Extensions are those placements of queens which do not violate any constraints of the rules of chess, and which cannot be augmented without causing a violation.
(2). Consider the default reals. In the ideal domain, we refer to elements by the real intervals to which they are isomorphic. These examples are intended to wean the reader away from the view of defaults as default logic. In the eight queens problem, it seems desirable to have a language for reasoning about di ering placements. We could of course capture an individual placement hiji of a queen as a proposition: a queen is at row i and column j. But it seems that what we want to do with a logic would be to reason about sets of individual placements. For example, given a placement, is there an extension to a complete placement with no diagonal attacks? The idea of \complete placement" in this example is captured by the original notion of extension due to Reiter. But now the notion is used model-theoretically.
Next we give a de nition of another, perhaps more intuitive, operator, used in the rstorder case by Reiter to characterize extensions. Reiter shows that the two operators have the same xed points; we show that they are the same operator.
De nition 4.2 Let A = (A; ;`) be a default information structure, and x a member of jAj. For any subset S, de ne x (S) to be the union The following result will be used later. Proof This is because the inconsistency of y implies y = x = x, since no default rule can ever be applied.
5 Dilations
We claimed at the beginning that extensions do not exist, even in reasonable cases. Here is a story to illustrate our point.
Story. There are three couples: Jimmy and Rosalind, Ronnie and Nancy, and
George and Barbara. In each couple, the partners are at war. No individual will ever appear at the same party to which the opposing individual was invited. On the other hand, Jimmy has a mild interest in Nancy, Ronnie with Barbara, and George with Rosalind. Thus it is plausible that these people should be seen in company together, and if there is a party to which all three couples are invited, arrangements might be made to go along with a person in whom one has a mild interest, because one should go to a party with a companion. We are Washington Post reporters, and have heard through the grapevine that a party occurred, to which important people were invited in couples. We are interested in just which males from the above set of people might have attended the party, taking into account that the war conditions de nitely hold, and that the mild side interests are plausible, perhaps even likely. Of course we have no real information about the party. This story leads to a reasonable default information structure with no extensions. Here is how it might be represented. We let j; ros; ron; n; g; and b represent the information that the various individuals attended the party. The war information is represented as follows:ì s generated from fj; rosg`;; fron; ng`;; fg; bg`;:
The side interests and their e ect on attendance are modeled by the following defaults: = f : j; n j ; : ron; b ron ; : g; ros g g: This default information structure has no extension for ;, the condition of having no information about the party. It turns out, though, that any two-element subset of the males is a dilation of the empty set, as is the set of all the males.
One key to our de nition is that dilations, in contrast to extensions, need only be closed under the various rules; the other key is that we de ne the relevant closure operator on consistent subsets of all plausible consequences of a given consistent set. Then take any xed point of the operator to form a dilation. It is important to keep in mind that although plausible consequence looks like a candidate for a non-monotonic entailment relation (as in e.g. 10] or 7]), we are not concerned with the axiomatic aspects of such a relation. It is used here only as part of a convenient notation for our model-building procedure 3 . we say y is a dilation of x, written x A y, if x is consistent and deductively closed: x = x; and y is a consistent, xed point of x . We also call (x; y) a dilation pair when y is a dilation of x.
We will often omit the subscripts in the relation A . It is normal for an information state x to have many dilations y. By the standard notion of a relation, stands for the set of dilation pairs associated with a default structure. Note that if y is a xed point of x , it is automatically deductively closed. Therefore, when x y, both x and y are elements of A.
The non-monotonic property of default information structures is captured by graphing the relation . It is easy to show that the rst component can increase while the second component decreases.
Rational Default Structures
One might hope that dilations existed for all default structures. Unfortunately this is not the case in general.
Example Let A = (A; ;`) be a default structure where A = fa; c; eg; = f fag : c ; fag : e g; and is generated by fc; eg`;: There is no dilation of fag. This is because the only candidates would be fa; cg and fa; eg.
However, neither of these is a xed point, let alone a consistent xed point, of fag . The problem is, of course, that c and e are incompatible, but both are in some sense derivable from a using the defaults. Since the default rules have empty justi cations, they should function something like monotonic rules. But if these defaults were part of the`relation, we then would violate the de nition of information system.
Our feeling is that the above system should have no dilations, and that we should restrict default structures as follows. In a default rule X : Y a ; there should be some logical relation among X; Y; and a. It is reasonable to assume that for any default rule of the above form we also have X; Y`a. In this case, we call a default information structure rational. Intuitively, a rational rule says that if the \justi cation" Y is not only consistent with our belief, but can be used as part of a monotonic inference of a, then we can also believe a. Insisting that rules be rational is to say that default entailment should agree with monotonic entailment whenever one is applying a default rule locally.
To prove the existence of dilations, we show that semi-normal default rules of the above form with a, the conclusion, in Y , are general enough.
Theorem 5.1 For every rational default information structure, there is a semi-normal default information structure with exactly the same dilations.
Proof Let A = (A; ;`) be a rational default information structure. To show existence of dilations in rational structures, it is therefore su cient to consider semi-normal ones. Theorem 5.2 Suppose A is a semi-normal default information structure. We have 8x 2 jAj 9y x y: Proof Take y to be a maximal, consistent subset of T (x) containing x. Since y is maximal, it is deductively closed. We show that it is also closed under semi-normal default rules. Indeed, let X y and X : Y b 2 such that Y y 2 Con. Since b is in Y , y fbg 2 Con. Therefore b 2 y, as y is a maximal consistent subset of T (x).
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Remark. The existence of a maximal consistent subset of T (x) follows from Zorn's lemma; the partial order involved is the collection of consistent subsets of T (x) under set inclusion. Any chain of this partial order clearly has a maximal element, which is just the union of the chain. Proof. We have to prove that z is a consistent xed point of x . We rst show that z T (x). Note that y T (x), because y is a xed point of x . Therefore, by our observations above, T (y) T (T (x)) = T (x), and since z T (y) we have our claim. Now notice that z x (z) y (z) = z. This gives the result immediately. 2 From the above proof it can be seen that whenever x y, z T (x), and y z, then it follows that x z.
The following theorem gives two more basic properties of the dilation relation. Clearly y is also a consistent subset of T (x 0 ). It is now clear that we can take y 0 to be a maximal consistent subset of T (x 0 ) extending y. 2
Extensions, Dilations, and Modified Extensions
In this section we compare dilations with Reiter-style extensions. We also compare dilations with a modi ed notion of extension due to Lukaszewicz 9] .
Minimality of Extensions
Given a default information structure A = (A; ;`), what exactly is the relationship between dilations and extensions? Theorem 4.1 concludes that an extension for x is just a xed point of the operator x . Since x is de ned on the powerset of A, it is also de ned on the powerset of T (x), a subset of A. A natural question: if y is an extension of x, is y a dilation of x? We will answer this question positively, showing that our notion of dilation is indeed a robust generalization of the notion of extension.
The following proposition is immediate in light of Theorem 4.1, since for every i, x y (i) T (x) when y is an extension of x. Proposition 6.1 A subset y is a xed point of x if and only if it is one for x when it is restricted to T (x). This leads us to the answer to our question above.
Theorem 6.1 Every extension y of x is also a dilation of x.
Proof It is enough to show x (y) = y, provided that x (y) = y. By Theorem 4.2, y is consistent. It is clearly deductively closed, and it contains x. Suppose X : Y a 2 ; X y; and Y y 2 Con: Because x (y) = y, and X is nite, X x y (i) for some i 0. Therefore a 2 x (y). Thus y is a xed point of x .
2
More interestingly, every extension of x is a minimal xed point of x . Thus an extension provides a minimal dilation for a given x. We conclude by mathematical induction that y z, and by the hypothesis of the theorem that y = z. 2
The converse need not be true: a minimal xed point of x is not necessarily an extension of x. This is because for nite rational default structures a minimal xed point of x always exists, while ? x may not have any xed point.
The previous theorem implies a property of conventional extensions themselves, which is known for rst order default theories from Reiter's work. Corollary 6.1 If y 1 and y 2 are both extensions of x such that y 1 y 2 , then y 1 = y 2 .
The following theorem indicates that extensions have a rather strong transitivity property. Theorem 6.3 If y is an extension of x and z is an extension of y, then y = z.
The proof of this theorem is not hard. It can be done by mathematical induction as in the proof of Theorem 6.2. However, it is a bit of a surprise to us that we could not nd the result in the literature.
Modified Extensions
We next compare our notion of dilation with the concept of modi ed extensions in the work of Lukaszewicz. This account can be found in Besnard's book on default logic 1]. (Two very much related concepts are the idea of J-extensions from the work of Delgrande and Jackson 5] , and the idea of assertional default theories due to Brewka 4] .) Etherington 6] further elaborates on extension existence problems. The idea in the work of Lukaszewicz is that the application of a default rule fails, when the consequent of that rule would contradict the justi cation of a default rule that had already been applied.
The way that Lukaszewicz's system works can be illustrated by our Washington Post story above. Recall that`is generated from fj; rosg`;; fron; ng`;; fg; bg`;:
We also have the following defaults: = f : j; n j ; : ron; b ron ; : g; ros g g:
Now, if we start with the empty set, the rst default is applicable, and we get j as part of a putative extension. However, we could not then, in Lukaszewicz's system, apply the second default, because the conclusion of that default (ron) is incompatible with the justi cation n in the rst default. Notice that we also can not apply the third default, because its justi cation is already incompatible with an already established conclusion. So, if we choose the rst default to apply, we get a modi ed extension fjg. Similarly, if we were to choose one of the other defaults to apply rst, we would get the modi ed extensions frong and fgg.
We omit the original de nition of modi ed extension, and instead present the construction analogous to Reiter's x operator. It is a function on pairs of token sets to pairs of token sets. The rst set in the pair keeps track of consequents, and the second keeps track of justi cations. Example. Referring to the Washington Post story, M ; (fjg; fng) = (fjg; fng):
Is there any relation between dilations and modi ed extensions? Lukaszewicz has shown that modi ed extensions exist for any default theory. It is not hard to show that the proof goes through for any default information system, even a nonrational one. So in this respect, modi ed extensions have an advantage over dilations. The advantage of dilations over extensions and modi ed extensions is rather in the locality of computation: in calculation the iterations for extensions and modi ed extensions, one continually has to check consistency with the nal answer. In contrast, each iteration in calculating the set of plausible consequences can be generated purely on the previous iterations. The xed point need only be taken at the end.
Consider another example: let fa; bg`;, and let = f : a b g: Then fbg is the unique dilation of ;, while ; is the unique modi ed extension of ;. This shows that modi ed extensions are \conservative", while dilations are \brave". It also shows that there need not be any inclusion relationships between modi ed extensions and dilations.
Besnard gives an example of a default theory with no maximal modi ed extension. In contrast, every ideal element will always have a maximal dilation in a rational default system, as our existence proof shows.
We feel that choosing between modi ed extensions and dilations will be a matter of taste. The real point is not that one system has priority over the other, but that both systems can be considered model-theoretically. To illustrate the point, let us consider another example from Lukaszewicz, as quoted in Besnard 1].
Example Normally on Sundays I go shing, unless I sleep late. Also, normally on holidays, I sleep late unless I go shing. We represent these sentences by the following pair of semi-normal default rules: s : f; w f ; h : :w; :f :w where w stands for \waking early", and the negated letters are just new tokens which clash with their positive versions. Now suppose our starting state of information is x = fs; hg: There are then two extensions of x: fs; h; fg, and fs; h; :wg. If we think of these extensions as theories, then the models of both theories (the ones which support the most reliable conclusions) are those which satisfy all of s; h; f; and :w. Such models violate the justi cations of both defaults { a fact which led to the de nition of modi ed extensions.
What if we think of these two extensions as themselves being models? Admittedly, they are partial models, as they may not settle facts not about shing and sleeping situations. But if we ask what formulas are supported in both models, we get pleasing results. For example, the formula f _ :w is supported in both models. Intuitively this says that if it is both a Sunday and a holiday, then I will either sleep late or go shing. This interpretation seems to us to be exactly right.
Dilations in precondition-free default structures
Recall that a default information structure is precondition-free if each default rule in is of the form : a a :
Such default rules are interesting because they are relatively expressive, and, moreover, extensions always exist. Theorem 6.4 Let (A; ;`) be a precondition-free default information structure. We have x y () y is an extension of x. Proof Theorem 6.1 shows that every extension determines a dilation. Therefore, it is enough to show that whenever x y, y is an extension of x. For any dilation pair (x; y), we have y = x (y), i.e. 
2
This result cannot be generalized to normal default information structures, ones for which the precondition is allowed to be some nite set X, but where the justi cation and conclusion are the same singleton set a. For Example Let (A; ;`) be a default information structure where A = f(0; i) j i 2 !g f(1; i) j i 2 !g; = f : (0; i) (0; i) j i 2 !g f (0; i) : (1; i) (1; i) j i 2 !g; and`is generated from f(0; i); (1; j)g`; whenever i 6 = j: Take y i = f(1; j) j j ig. We have a decreasing chain (;; y i ) of dilation pairs. However, T i2! y i = ; and ; is not a dilation of ;. Therefore, the decreasing chain under consideration does not have a greatest lower bound.
The above example also illustrates that ( A ; v) need not have a bottom element. In fact, much more complicated behavior is possible { the minimal elements of the partial order can be uncountable, even for countable A, and non-RE, even for recursive A. This can be seen from the following example.
Example Let (A; ;`) be a default information structure where A = f(0; i) j i 2 !g f(1; i) j i 2 !g; = f : (0; i) (0; i) j i 2 !g f : (1; i) (1; i) j i 2 !g; and`is generated from f(0; i); (1; i)g`; for every i 2 !: Then for each function f : ! ! f0; 1g, (;; f(f(i); i) j i 2 !g) is a minimal dilation.
We end this section with a default information structure whose represents a nite non-Scott domain.
Example Let The main technical result in the paper is the de nition of a notion of \generalized extension" for non-normal default structures, for which we can prove an existence result, and which are computed \locally", in the sense that pieces of information are added to a belief space without having to know what the nal belief space is. We also showed the relationship of our notion to the standard notion of extensions: when extensions exist, they are minimal dilations. We also gave a brief comparison to the Lukaszewicz de nition of modi ed extension. We do not want to claim that our notion of dilation is the \right" de nition for a belief space, though. Perhaps an even more robust de nition can be given. In particular, it might be possible to give a locally computed version of Lukaszewicz's modi ed extensions.
The real contribution of the paper, we feel, is that we view these xed point constructions as de ning models, not theories. We are taking the rst step towards a partial model theory for default reasoning. Although default logic itself forms an example of a default information system, we caution the reader not to take this example as a canonical one. Instead, one should think along the lines of denotational semantics for programming languages. There, a program will de ne, as its semantics, an element of a particular domain (the space of continuous functions from inputs to outputs). In analogy, we view a default information system as generating a relation on a domain: the dilation relation, in general, or the extension relation, in special cases. Just as program speci cations are given by a logic of such a domain, we think that a logic for default reasoning should really speak about things like the dilation relation generated by a default information system. We have some results in this direction, which will appear in subsequent papers 17, 16] .
Given this new perspective, it is perhaps not absolutely crucial to nd \the right" notion of generalized extension, which will form \the" class of belief spaces generated by, say, seminormal information systems. Our perspective, instead, leads us to other criteria. If default systems are like programs, and the meaning of a program is the function it computes, then the values of the function are nitely approximable as the limit of a sequence of nite partial functions. In the de nition of dilation, we have tried to capture this intuition by insisting that every token occurring in a dilation must appear by virtue of a nite chain of default rule applications. Each such rule application is a re ection of a reasoner's experience or preferences, encoded in the default rules of the system. The computations, in this respect, are entirely local; xed points are taken just once.
In a nal belief space (the result of a xed point construction) we see no reason why intermediate local pieces of information leading to the inclusion of a token in a space need themselves to be consistent with the nal space. The intermediate values used in the computation of a function need not ever appear as nal outputs; they need only be computed according to locally correct rules. So considerations like those in Delgrande and Jackson 5], and Lukascewicz 9] , which are concerned with inclusion of intermediate conclusions and/or justi cations in extensions, are for us a bit beside the point. Halpern, in a private communication, has also raised similar issues with us. He has asked why, in fact, one could not take any theory consistent with a base theory as an extension. We are inclined to say that Halpern might well be correct, except that the nite approximability property would be lost. Of course, the real point for us is that whatever xed point de nitions we settle on, we need to think of such xed points as models, not theories.
